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SHOULD JUDGES CONVICT BASED ON
THEIR SPECULATIONS OF GUILT?
DORON MENASHE* & EYAL GRUNER**

INTRODUCTION
May the court resort to speculations of guilt? I.e., may it
raise, of its own initiative, hypotheses not posed by the prosecution
and not directly arising from the evidence?
In the Zadorov case, Justice Amit adopts speculations of
guilt to explain away the use of a serrated knife' and foreign shoe
prints. 2 Whereas in the view of Justice Danziger, on the other hand,
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa.
Research Student, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa (2009-2013).
1 C.A. 7939/10 Zadorov v. State of Israel, at sec. 28-29 of Justice Amit's opinion
(Dec. 23, 2015) (Isr.) ("Zadorov"). Serrated knife marks were found on the decedent's chin, but all of the knives in the possession of the defendant, Zadorov, had a
straight edge. According to his confession (later recanted), he worked with a
retractable straight-edged utility knife (a "Japanese knife") and murdered her with
the knife he worked with. Justice Amit speculated to reconcile these facts with the
indictment: "Who can say with certainty that the appellant did not ultimately buy a
cartridge with serrated blades for a retractable knife?" "Who can say with certainty
that he did not use a grouting knife, which also has an interchangeable blade?"
"Who can say with certainty that in the course of setting down and cutting the
tiles, the appellant's blade did not scrape against something else, causing the blade
to be altered, even ifjust a bit, into a serrated shape?"
2 Id. In the Zadorov case, three bloody shoe prints were found in the bathroom
stall in which the decedent was found: On the toilet seat, on the toilet tank and on
the wall separating the second stall from the third stall. According to the evidence
from prosecution witness Shor, all of these imprints came from the same type of
shoe. These shoe prints did not match even one of the pairs of shoe given to Shor
to examine, and they did not match Zadorov's shoes. Justice Amit raised speculations to reconcile these facts with the indictment (Sec. 52 of his opinion): "The
three foreign shoe prints may be explained by the chaos which was created once
the body was discovered. Until the crime scene was properly sealed, various
civilians, Magen David Adorn medics and police officers entered this small
bathroom stall. List Tav/95 includes the name of fifteen people who are in the
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it would seem that when dealing with criminal cases, speculative
explanations of guilt should be inadmissible.
In this review, we will address the legitimacy of resorting to
hypothetical explanations (or "speculations") in order to fill in
evidentiary gaps, i.e. situations in which the evidentiary picture is
found lacking, and the court must determine, without specific
evidence, what has occurred. Our analysis will focus on the filling of
such gaps by the prosecution in criminal proceedings.
We will distinguish between the general legitimacy of
employing hypothetical explanations, on the one hand, and the
discretion granted to accept, reject or give weight to these specific
explanations, on the other hand. In this context, we will present four
categories of evidence: Situations involving evidentiary gaps, situations of evidentiary obstruction, situations of evidentiary paradoxes
and "speculations of power." We will discuss the question of how
the court should rule when any such category of evidence exists.

investigative material (testimony and statements) as those who entered the scene
of the crime, but only ten of them were interviewed on these prints. The size of the
bathroom stall does not leave room for more than one person, two at best, to
squeeze into the stall, and during the re-creation. the investigator who accompanied the appellant said spontaneously to the other police officers: 'There is no
room for two people in this stall.' Who can say with certainty that with the chaos
created, only those listed in List Tav/95 were present-a list that was compiled a
month after the murder, relying on the names of people who appeared in the investigative material? Why were Police Officer Shoshan David, Patrol Officer Arik,
Station Commander Reuven Arbel, the Chief of the Investigations Department and
Forensics Officer Shaked not questioned again? In another statement taken from
Paramedic Eyal Ben Moshe on 7 January 2007, he notes that he and his partner
were asked to move as little as possible at the scene, but he was never asked if
someone else had climbed or stood on the toilet or the tank. In his first statement,
from the day of the incident, Eyal Ben Moshe notes that Officer Reuven, who was
at the scene, requested that the decedent not be moved, because he and the driver
had 'entered the scene and left two sets of yellow medical gloves in the wastebasket in the bathroom, stepped in the area stained with blood and touched the
body with our gloves ....'
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THE LEGITIMACY OF TURNING TO
SPECULATIVE EXPLANATIONS

In our view, it is self-evident that relying on speculative or
hypothetical explanations in criminal or civil proceedings is not
illegitimate in principle. In practice, there is sometimes no other
option. A lack of evidence is the paradigm in which the operation of
inference is conducted, under conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, if
there is one thing which may be stated with certainty regarding the
establishment of facts in court on an evidentiary basis, it is that there
can never be facts that are inferred from evidence with absolute
certainty. The court cannot find facts by directly observing them, but
rather, can only determine its findings about an event which has
occurred in the past, an event for which the fact finders were not
present, which they did not observe and which they naturally cannot
recall. The court determines the facts in light of the impressions of
witnesses and analysis of objective evidence, i.e. indirectly, all while
the litigants (and, in particular, the defendant) have an interest in
misleading it in order to advance their interests in achieving the
legal results they seek. In keeping with John Locke's epistemological classifications in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690), the source of knowledge employed by the court is in moral
proofs, i.e. second-hand reports of sensory evidence, without the fact
finder absorbing the sensory evidence personally, or first-hand, but
inferring by a range of evidence, some of which consists of reports
by witnesses of what they observed first-hand. This is to be
distinguished from direct sensory observation and from logical or
mathematical deduction.4
'

DORON MENASHE, EYAL GRUNER,
PROCEDURE 41, 118 (Nebo, 2017).

REASONABLE DOUBT

IN

CRIMINAL

' Id. at 141-42; Barbara Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty: Theories of Knowledge
andAnglo-AmericanJuries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 158 (1986-1987);
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,book IV, ch. XVI

(1690); N. SHOCHAT, The Moral and Legal Obligation to Protect the Innocent
from False Conviction: A Critical and Analytical Examination of Normative and
Procedural Obligations of the Legal System 262 (University of Haifa, Faculty of
Law, 2015) (doctoral dissertation).

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vols. 36-37

When presented with evidence that cannot produce certainty,
the fact finder cannot employ epistemic justification in the strong
sense, but only in the weak sense. Epistemic justification in the
strong sense is epistemic justification which yields absolute certainty in a conclusion, i.e. a conclusion beyond any doubt. However,
such essential certainty is not realistic, and thus the only available
justification in a situation of uncertainty is epistemic justification in
the weak sense. Justification in the weak sense supports a conclusion which is not certain but is strong enough to dispel skepticism.
Justification in the weak sense supports a conclusion which is
stronger than any other-the "most correct" conclusion as opposed
to the "correct" conclusion-and it supports a conclusion which is
stronger than the opposite conclusion or the negation of said conclusion. Epistemic justification in the weak sense is not justification
which creates certainty, but it does create theories which have varying levels of epistemic power, or varying levels of reasonability.5
Therefore, the choice is to rely on epistemic justification in
the weak sense, or to give up on epistemic justification altogether.
Choosing the latter is inappropriate, as this all-or-nothing approach
means either having epistemically-informative perfection or an utter
rejection of any epistemic resource. This approach gives full weight
to the minor possibility of error, and no weight at all to arguments
which have even a small measure of uncertainty. If we refuse to
accept any claim that is not certain, this means passing up the ability
to prefer arguments if they are not certain. It is true that when there
is no certainty the possibility of error grows, but why is that worse
than the position of ignorance? If we arrive at the conclusion that we
do not know, and therefore, there is no reason to prefer one option
over another, this too presents a danger: Namely, that we will not
take advantage of the partial, uncertain knowledge we do have, and
that this information will be wasted, despite the fact that it is available. This approach rejects the partially epistemic situation- partial
information which cannot create certainty, on the one hand, but
which, on the other hand, is better than nothing. This rejection is
senseless, as there is no justification to demand informative perfec' Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3, at 39-40.
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tion as an absolute prerequisite for epistemic intellectual activity.
There is no reason not to extract whatever we may from partial
information, though it may be imperfect and incapable of generating
certainty. Epistemic justification in the weak sense is an essential
part of the explanatory-interpretive and intellectual activity of
epistemic-probative discretion.6
Moreover, ignoring justification in the weak sense means
refusing to distinguish between a situation in which no good evidence is available to buttress any argument, and a situation in which
evidence is available but doubts remain. Assuming that it is indefensible to equate these two situations and see no distinction between
them requiring a different approach, we must find a way to take into
account justifications in the weak sense.7
Who may raise speculative explanations?
In light of the abovementioned necessity of taking speculative explanations into account, we believe that each side is allowed
to raise them, all the more so when the proceedings are civil in
nature, so that both the plaintiff and the defendant may use them. In
our view, the intellectual endeavor of analyzing evidence under
conditions of uncertainty needs to allow each side to raise hypotheses which do not have a direct expression in the corpus of evidence,
but which may be inferred, or to reconcile such hypotheses with the
corpus of evidence, showing that it does not contradict the evidence.
In civil proceedings, it is even clearer that this is correct, as the
verdict itself is often "speculative," because the standard of probability is the absolute minimum above 50%.

However, we believe that in criminal proceedings as well,
both sides should be allowed raise speculative explanations. These
arguments do not constitute evidence in their own right, but rather,
analysis of the evidence. Meaning, either side of a criminal proceeding may propose its own analysis of the corpus of evidence. The
court is not required to accept this analysis and may certainly dismiss it, but in principle there is nothing preventing them from
6

Id. at 40, 118. See also Doron Menashe, Further Thoughts on Ehud Olmert's

Conviction in the Holyland Affair, ALEI ISHPAT 131 (2016).
7 Menashe & Guner, supra note 3, at 40.
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accepting the prosecution's analysis. In our view, no epistemic or
normative considerations prevent accepting speculative hypotheses,
even those offered by the prosecution, as long as these hypotheses
are acceptable on their own terms.
II.

THE WEIGHT OF SPECULATIVE
EXPLANATIONS

Since we have established that it is legitimate to attempt to
justify explanations and interpretations of evidentiary gaps, we
should turn to the second question: The amount of weight to give to
these explanations when they are offered by the prosecution in a
criminal case. The explanations are required in this situation in light
of the ostensible appearance of exculpatory evidence, or certain
defects which may have arisen in the process of "producing" the
prosecution's evidence.8
In order to evaluate the appropriate weight for speculative explanations, we propose splitting them into four categories 9 of evidence:
A.
B.
C.
D.

8

Evidentiary gap;
Evidentiary obstruction;
Evidentiary paradox; and
Speculations of power

For example, situations such as taking statements, conducting a lineup or

collecting and processing forensic evidence.
9 We may say that every one of these categories of evidence represents a
deviation, to whatever extent, from the norm, by which, if a crime is committed,
the evidence will definitely indicate guilt and not innocence, though perhaps not at
the level required for the court to accept it in a criminal case. This is due to the
phenomenon of a crime leaving evidence of its commission, and this is in addition
to the filtering of the prosecution, which indicts when it has sufficient evidence, in
its view. On the other hand, acts do not always produce evidence that will suffice
to establish the highest levels of probability, and therefore, a doubt remains that
despite the evidence, these acts were not committed.
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A. The Evidentiary Gap

This would appear easy to decide. Evidentiary gap is a
situation in which the evidence is ambiguous and does not point in a
consistent direction. In this case, there is no need for speculations to
explain the inconsistent evidence. Such a case demands acquittal, as
the unequal consequences of risk of error demand that the burden be
placed on the accuser.
This was the situation in the Holyland affair, in which Ehud
Olmert was charged with receiving bribes.10 On the one hand, there
was no conclusive evidence proving the transfer of money from the
prosecution witness to Yossi Olmert. The checks were not presented
in court, nor the back accounts of Yossi Olmert or the prosecution's
witness. There were no records of financial withdrawals or deposits
from the witness to Yossi Olmert. 11 When a litigant decides not to
present a certain piece of evidence which could illuminate a point,
despite it being under his control and there being no justification for
refusing to show it, we must infer that it is to his detriment. In the
Holyland affair, the prosecution produced no such evidence and thus
diminished the credibility of its position, relying on the testimony of
the prosecution witness and Yossi Olmert's statement, which he
recanted. This lack of evidence buttressed defendant Ehud Olmert's
claim that he received no bribes or at least did not know about any
funds being transferred from the prosecution witness to his brother
Yossi Olmert, assuming that this crime took place. 12 When such
anticipated evidence is lacking, the probability of guilt is lessened
while the probability of innocence is increased.
On the other hand, the lack of checks did not prove that no
money was transferred, as this could have been done with cash or
third-party checks. 13

10

CrimA (TA) 5270/14 Olmert v State of Israel, PM (2014) (Isr.); see also

Menashe, supra note 6 (providing a detailed critical analysis of the conviction in
the Tel Aviv district court).
" Menashe, supranote 6 at 128; Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3, at 198.
12Menashe, supranote 6, at 129-30; Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3, at 198-99.
13Menashe, supranote 6, at 131; Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3, at 199.
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Even were we to assume that a check given to someone like
Yossi Olmert would be immediately cashed, it could have been
post-dated, meaning it would be usable only later; moreover, this
assumes that
the payer did not indicate that there was reason not to
14
it.
deposit
Bank records are inconclusive in terms of establishing this
payment by the witness. For bribery to be proven, it was enough for
the checks to have been handed over, whether or not they were
deposited. Moreover, evidence existed of the payment: The witness's testimony and the recipient's
statement. This testimony was
15
not negated, but doubt remained.
This is a situation of evidentiary gap, in which both guilt and
innocence are reasonable. To wit, it is reasonable that Ehud Olmert
never received a bribe and reasonable that he did. Evidence exists,
on the one hand, that the payment was executed: Ehud Olmert never
denied the factual basis, Yossi Olmert gave a statement that he
received the checks, against his interest, and this matched the details
given by the prosecution witness. 16 On the other hand, we have no
factual data establishing the transfer of funds beyond a reasonable
doubt. When evidence exists that this transaction took place, but
other anticipated evidence is missing, both the thesis of guilt and the
thesis of innocence are supportable based on the evidence.
Such a
17
case of evidentiary gap appears to demand an acquittal.
This situation arises when supporting or reliable evidence
exists on both sides of the equation, for both guilt and innocence.
The evidentiary picture is thoroughly inconsistent and does not
convincingly make the case for guilt or innocence. In such a situation, speculations of guilt should not form the basis of conviction,
because evidence which points to innocence should not be unintuitively reconciled in some way with the guilt hypothesis. This would
be 'begging the question' of when the evidentiary gap disallows
such a presumption. Thus, in the Holyland affair, just as the court
could not adopt the defense's view that the production of the checks
14 Menashe,

supranote 6, at
Menashe, supranote 6, at
16 Menashe, supranote 6, at
17 Menashe, supranote 6, at
15

132; Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3.
133.
133-34; Menashe & Gruner, supra note 3.
134.
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had not been proven, such that the prosecution's argument should be
rejected (speculation of innocence), it similarly could not be inferred
that the existing evidence of this payment should lead the court to
ignore the missing evidence (speculation of guilt). 18 In this case, the
evidence was ambiguous, and this should have been to the prosecution's detriment, and the defense's benefit. 19
B. Evidentiary Obstruction
In such cases, the incriminating evidence is very strong and
consistent, so that the crushing weight of probability (to the extent
that it would insult common sense to ignore it) demands rejecting
any hypothesis of innocence.2 °
If the incriminating evidence is so powerful, as in this situation, then the evidence which does not indicate guilt creates an
evidentiary gap, which may be explained reasonably.
In a situation of evidentiary obstruction, it is justified to
adopt a speculative explanation to reject any hypothesis of innocence based on evidence which does not indicate guilt. This is
justified by the fact that at this stage, a hypothesis of innocence is of
negligible worth in terms of probability. In this situation, every
reasonable hypothesis which could explain the evidentiary gap is
coherent with the overwhelming probabilistic accumulation of incriminating evidence from the prosecution. If we reach the conclusion
that the power of incriminating evidence is so high, this means any
hypothesis of innocence has a corresponding drop in probability,
even approaching zero. In this case, naturally, the speculations for
evidentiary gap fit with guilt, and they are an inherent part of the
epistemic logic of the verdict.
In a situation of evidentiary obstruction, speculations of guilt
are justified because of the conclusion the court has already reached:
The incriminating evidence is so overwhelming, probabilistically,
18]d
19
-1d. at 135.
2' For example, a gambler in a casino may play a game in which the chances of

winning are negligible; if he wins turn after turn, it is an insult to common sense to
claim that "circumstantially" he is simply having a run of good luck.
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that it would be an insult to common sense to question it. As
opposed to the evidence for acquittal, which is correspondingly
underwhelming. In such a case, it makes sense to explain exculpatory evidence in a way consistent with guilt, even speculatively,
because we have already reached the conclusion that the incriminating evidence is overwhelming, notwithstanding the exculpatory
evidence. The presumption of the overwhelming incriminating
power is not 'begging the question,' because it is inferred prior to
this point by analyzing the corpus of evidence. In this case, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the defendant is guilty. Therefore, if
there is a speculative way to explain the exculpatory evidence to fit
with guilt, this conforms to the presumption of guilt due to the
overwhelming incriminating evidence. Moreover, the fact that the
exculpatory evidence can be explained away speculatively means
that the exculpatory evidence is underwhelming; overwhelming evidence could not be explained away, even speculatively. In this case,
conviction is justified because of the overwhelming incriminating
evidence, creating a presumption that every item of exculpatory
evidence which may fit with guilt speculatively does not contradict
guilt; and indeed, in practice, all of the exculpatory evidence may be
reconciled with guilt in a speculative manner.
C. Evidentiary Paradox
Evidentiary paradox is a situation in which the incriminating
evidence is very strong, such as in the situation of evidentiary
obstruction; however, the evidence which does not fit with guilt
generates an evidentiary gap which cannot be reasonably explained,
so that any attempt to explain it is obstructed by the lack of feasible
probability.
In a case of evidentiary paradox, we have, on the one hand,
incriminating evidence which ostensibly leaves any hypothesis of
innocence with a negligible probability; on the other hand, any
attempt to explain the evidentiary gap also appears to be negligibly
reasonable, so that it, too, runs into evidentiary obstruction. In other
words, the probability of innocence in light of the incriminating
evidence is tiny, but so is the probability of guilt in light of the other
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evidence. This indicates a lack of sufficient information to resolve
the paradox. If we cannot locate such information, we remain with
an evidentiary paradox. This would ostensibly lead to acquittal; just
as evidentiary ambiguity leads to acquittal.
In this situation, both the incriminating and the exculpatory
evidence is overwhelming. There is just a mutual evidentiary
obstruction, for guilt and for innocence. In such a situation, it is
impossible to make the exculpatory evidence fit with guilt, even
speculatively. Any such attempt would insult common sense. Thus,
evidentiary paradox leads to acquittal.
A question arises: What does it mean to be incapable of
giving a speculative explanation of exculpatory evidence? A classic
example is that we cannot propose a hypothesis with empirical and
logical support which allows this exculpatory evidence to exist at
the same time that the defendant has in fact committed the crime.
This is a prerequisite for the evidentiary paradox, but is it sufficient?
We think not: There may be cases in which we cannot understand
the logic, but there is still support for the existence of such logic
(though we cannot comprehend it, at least at the moment).
For an instance of logic existing, though we do not grasp it,
consider the stage magician who saws someone in half, apparently.
The audience knows this is an illusion, even though it cannot
explain the mechanism of the trick. There is a logical basis which
allows us the presumption that we are seeing things, as it were. On
the other hand, if a human being were bisected under laboratory
conditions, the observers would not presume some logical mechanism beyond their understanding, but rather that people are indeed
being split in two.
Therefore, not all unexplainable exculpatory evidence
creates an evidentiary paradox. If we have a logical basis, we may
presume a logical explanation which is, at the moment, beyond our
comprehension. An evidentiary paradox exists only when we have
no logical basis to assume a reasonable explanation for the exculpatory evidence despite the defendant's guilt.

140
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Let us demonstrate this with the Zadorov case.21 Imagine
there was a camera at the murder scene recording, and we could
watch Zadorov committing the murder. The foreign shoe prints, in
such an instance, would not be exculpatory evidence creating an
evidentiary paradox, and the hypothesis would be justified. This is
based on the assumption that the foreign shoe prints do not have the
same epistemic weight as watching a video recording. These shoe
prints may be explained, though with some difficulty, as fitting with
guilt; a video recording cannot be explained away. However, if there
were two cameras, one showing Zadorov committing the murder
and one showing someone else committing the murder, this would
be sufficient to create an evidentiary paradox. Even if the foreign
shoe prints are strongly exculpatory, we can conceive of a logical
mechanism to make them fit with guilt. On the other hand, it is
difficult to imagine such a mechanism for the video recording, as
long as we could be sure that the footage had not been falsified or
manufactured.
D. Justice Danziger's Approach to Speculative
Hypotheses in the Zadorov Case
Let us consider the Zadorov case, in which Justice Danziger
dismisses speculations of guilt which Justice Amit proposes for
exculpatory evidence. In the first instance, these address the fact that
wounds on the decedent's chin indicate that the murder weapon was
serrated; 22 in the second, these address the foreign shoe prints found
in the bathroom stall.23
The justification for speculations of guilt is based on the
question of whether the incriminating evidence in the Zadorov case
creates an overwhelming probability of guilt, so that it would be an
insult to common sense to claim that he is not the murderer. If the
answer is negative, then there is an "evidentiary gap" much like in

21 See supra note 2.
22

23

See Zadorov, supranote 1.
See supra note 2.
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the Holyland affair, and thus, in light of the exculpatory evidence,
he should not be convicted by relying on speculations of guilt.
However, if the answer is affirmative and overwhelming
incriminating evidence exists, this creates a situation of evidentiary
obstruction, and it is justified to examine speculations of guilt which
would make Zadorov guilty despite the exculpatory evidence. The
question is what the probabilistic picture of the exculpatory evidence
looks like.
In a case of evidentiary obstruction, if the exculpatory evidence is not probabilistically overwhelming (as opposed to the incriminating evidence), conviction is justified based on speculations of
guilt to resolve the issues of the serrated knife wounds and the
foreign shoe prints. If there is a possibility of raising a speculation
which does not insult common sense according to which these
issues can be reconciled with Zadorov's guilt, he may be convicted
on the basis of these speculations of guilt.
However, if we face an evidentiary paradox, in which the
exculpatory evidence is just as probabilistically overwhelming as the
incriminating evidence, then there is no justification for convicting
Zadorov on the basis of speculations of guilt such as Justice Amit
offers for the knife wounds and the shoe prints. In this situation,
such speculations of guilt are inadmissible, as they would insult
common sense. This is an evidentiary paradox requiring Zadorov's
acquittal.
In the Zadorov case, Justice Danziger rejects the speculations of guilt by Justice Amit:
"In my view, we are talking about speculations
which have no basis in the evidence, defying clearly
objective proof which does not fit with the confessions. 4
"In this context, I must warn-as regards this case
and criminal cases, however they may be-against
raising hypotheses to the detriment of the defendant,
24 See Zadorov, supranote 1.
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with the aim of filling an evidentiary "gap" or to
explain some question or other which arises from the
corpus of evidence. Naturally, I do not say this every
time an evidentiary "hole" opens, as this would mean
automatic acquittal. It is clear that there will be cases
in which logic, common sense or the corpus of
evidence will demand and require that this gap be
filled. Of course, we do not seek that the conviction
be based on a full and complete picture of the commission of the crime. In almost every criminal case,
there are gaps and open questions, even when guilt
has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, I see that it is worth emphasizing that
closing holes, questions or gaps which arise from the
corpus of evidence, in a way which works to the
detriment of the defendant, must be done with the
utmost caution. In my view, the judge must deal with
a "crack" in the corpus of evidence before him and
ask himself if the explanation at issue has a true
logical basis and some foundation in the evidence, or
if perhaps we are talking about a simple presumption
which ultimately leads to inferring things by 'begging the question.' It appears that this is further reinforced when these hypotheses and explanations are
those which the prosecution has never raised.2 5
"This is the place to note that my colleague reckons
the failure to interrogate the appellant about his
knives to the detriment of the defense, but he does
not consider the fact that the respondent did not see
any need to interrogate the appellant about this issue,
even though the matter of the knife blade was
already a matter of dispute in the "first go-round" in
the district court (in the context of Peleg's opinion).
It remains to note that the burden of proving guilt is
25

Id. at 205.
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upon the respondent, and we should not turn things
topsy-turvy in this regard.26
"Indeed, this is not proof, but a guess or hypothesis.
As for logic, it is a matter of debate as to what extent
we may venture forth into the realms of logic without
any true evidentiary 2foundation,
when we are talking
7
law.",
about criminal
Justice Danziger acquitted Zadorov, justifying it thusly:
"I will stress that we are talking about a borderline
case, a "step" away from conviction, as stated. The
possibility that the appellant was convicted as a
blameless man requires a concatenation of unlikely
circumstances. In other words, the probability that
the appellant is innocent is not very high. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, in my view, we cannot suffice to let the conviction stand. Even though
the corpus of evidence ties the appellant to the
commission of the murder quite intimately, as stated,
we cannot "round down" the doubts which arise and
surface from
it, which must be reckoned to his
28
benefit.,
With all due respect, we believe that Justice Danziger's
reasons for rejecting Justice Amit's speculation and his support for
acquitting Zadorov do not stand up to critical analysis. Let use
examine them individually.

26

1d. at 204.

27
1d.
2

at 360.
1Jd.at 354.
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1. Anchoring the Explanation of the Evidentiary Gap in the Corpus of Evidence
in a Concrete and Direct Way
Justice Danziger is ready to accept explanations for holes
and gaps as long as they are not speculative, i.e. as long as they are
anchored in the corpus of evidence. However, Justice Danziger
means this in the narrow sense, i.e. that the corpus of evidence must
directly and concretely support the specific explanation proposed. If
the explanation is that Zadorov disposed of his serrated knives after
the murder, then the corpus of evidence must support, concretely
and directly, that Zadorov disposed of the knives. If the foreign shoe
prints are explained by saying that one of the first responders
entered the stall and left them, then the corpus of evidence must
directly and concretely support this contention.
We demur and believe that this requirement should be
understood in the broad sense: Not just concrete and direct support
of the proposed explanation, but speculative and indirect support as
well. Even if the evidentiary material does not directly and concretely support the contention that Zadorov threw away the knives
or that one of the first responders entered the stall, if the incriminating evidence is so strong and overwhelming and the exculpatory
evidence is not, then we have a situation of "evidentiary obstruction" and therefore one may explain the exculpatory evidence in
such a way that fits with guilt; and if we cannot explain the entirety
of the incriminating evidence in such a way that fits with innocence,
then in the broader and indirect sense, the corpus of evidence
supports speculations of guilt.
Justice Danziger does not distinguish between a situation in
which the incriminating evidence is overwhelming and the exculpatory evidence is underwhelming (a situation of evidentiary
obstruction) and its converse; therefore, in a sweeping manner, he
negates speculations of guilt. Such a sweeping rejection, we believe,
is inappropriate. It creates a lack of coherence when we already have
a conclusion according to which the incriminating evidence is
overwhelming yet refuse to interpret exculpatory evidence in light of
this conclusion which already exists and is very well-founded.
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Speculations of guilt may be justified in light of a well-founded
conclusion which the court has already arrived at concerning the
overwhelming probability of the incriminating evidence, i.e. a
conclusion of evidentiary obstruction.
2. Begging the Question
Justice Danziger negates the speculations of guilt due to the
reason of 'begging the question.' However, we should take into
account that if the conclusion concerning the overwhelming probability of incriminating evidence and the lack of overwhelming
probability of the exculpatory evidence has a proper foundation, i.e.
if we have a situation of evidentiary obstruction, then we do not
have a case of 'begging the question,' but rather, a well-founded
presumption.
3. Burden of Proof on the Prosecution
Justice Danziger determines that the prosecution did not
interrogate Zadorov about his knives, when the burden of proof was
on its shoulders. Indeed, the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
However, aside from the burden of proof, there is also a burden of
presenting evidence or burden of interpretation, and this burden is
likely to be borne by the defendant. The situation may arise in which
the prosecution has met the burden by presenting incriminating
evidence which is probabilistically overwhelming, while the exculpatory evidence is not. This is "evidentiary obstruction." If the
prosecution succeeds in showing that the corpus of evidence creates
evidentiary obstruction, then the burden of presenting proof or the
burden of interpretation passes to the defendant to show that despite
the overwhelming probability of the incriminating evidence, the
exculpatory evidence cannot be reconciled with guilt. If the defendant neglects to do so, consistency demands the conclusion emerging from the fact that the prosecution has already proven the overwhelming power of the incriminating evidence and the underwhelming power of the exculpatory evidence. The necessary conclusion is
that, with a lack of explanation, the exculpatory evidence does not
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fit with guilt. This explanation must be provided by the defendant,
because the prosecution cannot know how to explain a claim of
innocence to which it is not a party.
To summarize, Justice Danziger sets out three conditions for
explaining evidentiary holes: (1) Concrete and direct anchoring of
the explanations of evidentiary holes; (2) a lack of 'begging the
question' in these explanations; (3) maintaining the burden of proof
on the prosecution. This means that Justice Danziger does not distinguish between a situation in which the incriminating evidence is
probabilistically overwhelming and the exculpatory evidence is not
(evidentiary obstruction) and a situation in which this is not the case
(evidentiary paradox or evidentiary gap). This is a mistake, because
such a distinction is critical for the legitimacy of the conviction in
light of speculations.
4. Justifying the Acquittal Due to Exculpatory Evidence Despite a Distant
Possibility of Innocence
To justify the acquittal, Justice Danziger determines that the
power of incriminating evidence creates a situation which is a step
away from conviction-despite that for Zadorov to be innocent
would require a concatenation of unlikely circumstances.
This is wrong, as an evidentiary situation in which the possibility of innocence is "a concatenation of unlikely circumstances" is
likely to fit with evidentiary obstruction, i.e. when the incriminating
evidence is probabilistically overwhelming but the exculpatory
evidence is not. Justice Danziger does not explain why despite the
fact that the possibility of innocence requires a concatenation of
unlikely circumstances, nevertheless the incriminating evidence is
not so probabilistically overwhelming as to prevent the defendant
from offering an explanation of his innocence which is not an insult
to common sense (i.e. a situation of evidentiary gap). Perhaps the
power of the exculpatory evidence is such that, alongside the overwhelming incriminating evidence, it would still not be an insult to
common sense to raise a hypothesis of innocence (i.e. a situation of
evidentiary paradox)? Without such a reason, as stated, there is not
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sufficient foundation to justify ignoring the power of incriminating
evidence and grasp only the exculpatory evidence.
Moreover, it appears that Justice Danziger bases the acquittal on the very fact that exculpatory evidence exists, without relying
on the power of the incriminating evidence. With all due respect, we
find this approach wholly in error. Based on this, we would have to
say that to convict a defendant, there could not be any exculpatory
evident which cannot be directly and concretely disproven. This
approach ignores the question of how compelling the incriminating
evidence is and how compelling the exculpatory evidence is (or is
not). In other words, Justice Danziger assumes only the possibility
of an evidentiary gap, and does not examine the possibility of
evidentiary obstruction or evidentiary paradox. If the incriminating
evidence is compelling, but not the exculpatory evidence (i.e. evidentiary obstruction), it would create a lack of coherence were we to
justify acquittal in every situation in which exculpatory evidence
appears without concrete, direct support but with indirect, general
support from the entirety of the corpus of evidence. If nevertheless
the exculpatory evidence can fit with guilt in a speculative way, this
means that we have a consistent epistemic picture. The speculative
resolution of the exculpatory evidence with guilt epistemically dovetails with the conclusion already well-founded concerning the overwhelming incriminating evidence.
From what is stated above, it arises that Justice Danziger's
acquittal in the Zadorov case cannot withstand criticism, as long as
there is no basis provided for the probabilistically overwhelming
power of the exculpatory evidence (evidentiary paradox) or the
probabilistically overwhelming power of the incriminating evidence
is not undermined (evidentiary gap). As stated, Justice Danziger
does not present such a basis.
III.

"SPECULATIONS OF POWER"

The fourth category of evidence we propose is "speculations
of power." In this situation, the court must determine among various
low-probability events, one of which, logic dictates, must have taken
place.
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These are situations in which every possible event is uncommon. When every event is rare, one of them still must be the correct
option. In this situation, it is incorrect to discount an unlikely possibility because of its unlikeliness, since every alternative is unlikely
as well.
Thus, if the event indicating guilt is unlikely, as is the event
indicating innocence, then in a relative sense, neither can be rejected
because of its unlikeliness. It is clear that in this situation, the correct
and true possibility is an uncommon one, and thus choosing one
unlikely alternative over another cannot be a justification or consideration. Below, we will present two situations of speculations of
power: One of suppressed memories, and the other from the Nissim
Haddad affair.
IV.

SPECULATIONS OF POWER IN SUPPRESSED
MEMORIES

The issue of suppressed memories arises, for example, in a
case in which a father is accused of raping his daughter, who
recovers these memories long after the alleged events, due to a
psychological process called dissociative amnesia (commonly
referred to as suppressed memories): 29 The rapes were not forgotten,
but rather suppressed and inaccessible in the subconscious, as a
defense mechanism against the traumatic event. Only with the
passage of time from the event or due to certain other triggering
events would these memories come to the surface of the conscious

29

Dissociative amnesia is the scientific terms for suppressed memories, as

described by Eli Zomer in his lecture, "Suppressed Memories: Science, Law and
Society" at a symposium at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. SomerClinic,
Suppressed Memories: Science, Law and Society, YouTUBE (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2168JXUi6fM.
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mind as "recovered memories."3 ° The entire' 31process is sometimes
known as "recovering suppressed memories. ,
The possible events in light of the complainant's claim are
the following:
1) She is telling the truth; the rapes occurred and dissociative
amnesia caused her to forget it until the memories were
eventually recovered. The recovered suppressed memories
are accurate 2
2) The memory is honest but false; the complainant believes
what she is saying, but these rapes never occurred, and these
are false memories. They could be the product of suggestibility (implanted memories-e.g. the therapist might have
explained her behavior as indicating sexual assault, causing
the complainant to believe this incorrectly) or auto-suggestibility (i.e. the complainant herself came up with the idea of
sexual assault and convinced herself) 3
3) This is a false complaint. The complainant knows that no
rapes occurred, but she wants to slander her father for
another motive, e.g. revenge or extortion. 4
A priori, the probability of each of the three events is low: It
is unlikely that a father would rape his daughter, it is unlikely that
events which never occurred would be implanted in the complainant's mind, and it is unlikely that the daughter would fabricate a tale
of incestuous rape out of whole cloth.
30 Limor Etzioni, Re: Crim. App. 5582109, Anonymous v State of Israel, Con-

cerning the Question of SuppressedMemories in Israeli Law, ALEI MISHPAT 479,
482-90.
3 A statement of opinion on the scientific status of suppressed and recovered

memories, 12.10.2014, available at https://www.haaretz.co.il/st/inter/Hheb/images
/gilui.pdf.
32 Etzioni, supra note 29.
33
Id. at 490-95; Statement of Opinion, supranote 30.
3' Doron Menashe, Liran Ohayon, "The Unconsidered Hypothesis: Lying about

Sexual Assault Based on Suppressed Memories," Dynameet: The Doctoral Blog
of the Faculty of Law, University of Haifa (23.10.2014).
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Nevertheless, these are the only options. One of these must
be true, so the unlikeliness of any is irrelevant, as all the other alternatives are rare. Each offsets the other. In such a situation of
unlikely speculations of guilt (all the more so with unlikely speculations of innocence), rarity is not a sufficient reason to dismiss them.
V.

FALSE COMPLAINT: HOW RARE IS IT?

We should note that false complaints are rare, particularly
those expressed by a daughter against her father. Unlike the spousal
relationship, the parental relationship involves biological-evolutionary "attachment" which deters a child from slandering a parent.
Despite this, we should not exaggerate how uncommon the phenomenon is when35 it comes to suppressed memories, for the
following reasons:
First of all, a priori, this is a low-probability event, but this is
not the probability we must examine. Rather, we must consider the
likelihood of falsehood once such a complaint has been introduced.
When we consider the relevant conditional probabilities (given the
claim about these serious crimes) in a comparative manner, a very
small percentage of those who are lying may prefer to hang on to the
suppressed memories argument so as not to encourage questions
about testimony concealed for so many years.
Second, if there is no price to pay for false complaints, such
a regime emboldens not only true complaints but false ones as well.
It may very well be that as a result, the victim's complaint and testimony are rendered powerless in criminal jurisprudence; in other
words, the reasonability of accepting such a complaint will be more
or less equal whether we assume the event happened or not.
Third, if the judicial process is limited in its ability to identify authentic emotional distress, and the possibility exists of a false
positive in which the court may determine facts in error, the deterrence for false complaints is reduced.
Fourth, the more the court uses common-sense considerations to determine the veracity of a complaint, the more the com35

id.
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plainant can prepare herself for her testimony and present herself as
a true victim, so that the court may be utterly unable to discern any
duplicity on her part.
Fifth, the more the defendant acts towards the complainant
in a manner which is violent or inflicts suffering, but does not establish the fundamental elements of the crime, the greater is the motive
for revenge on her part.
VI.

THE NISSIM HADDAD AFFAIR

In this affair,36 the appellant was successful in appealing his
conviction in district court of sodomizing a minor relative (under
age fourteen) and aggravated assault. The evidence showed that an
eighteen-month-old had been left alone for a certain amount of time
with his mother's boyfriend in the gym of their building; the mother
reported that when the toddler came back, he was suffering from
two anal tears.37
This event is an extremely rare one; expert witnesses said
they had never encountered one. Nevertheless, the prosecution
presented cases of even younger children being assaulted. 38
The exculpatory alternative is that because the toddler was
taking iron supplements which caused constipation, he developed
anal fissures. These fissures started bleeding in the gym, and a finger
inserted anally caused the fissures to become tears. 39 This too would
be a rare event. Though sodomizing a toddler is uncommon but not
unknown, a fissure developing into a tear due to the insertion of a
finger is an event which the defense could not present one example
of in medical history. Moreover, since anal fissures among young
children are quite common, more cases of these fissures becoming
tears due to the insertion of a finger would be expected.4 °

The incriminating event (sodomizing a toddler) is uncommon and the exculpatory event (an anal fissure becoming a tear by
C.A. 2967/14 Nissim Haddad v. State of Israel, 2016.
Id. at3.
38
1Id. at 36, 96.
3
36

37
9

4

_d. at

98.

1d. at 101.
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the insertion of a finger) is uncommon; however, logic dictates one
of them must have happened, as no one denies the toddler's wounds,
nor does anyone suggest a third event. Each of the events is rare in
terms of unconditional a priori probability, but not rare as a matter
of conditional a priori probability-the probability conditioned on
this specific corpus of evidence. In this situation, one cannot invalidate the speculations of guilt due to statistical rarity, since this is
offset by the rarity of the sole alternative, the exculpatory event.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have examined whether it is justified for
the court to raise speculations of guilt in its criminal rulings. We
have shown that this is legitimate in principle because of the uncertainty inherent in a given corpus of evidence.
We have mainly dealt with the weight of speculative explanations in different situations, a typology of four categories of
evidence.
1) Evidentiary Gap: A situation in which both the incriminating
event and the exculpatory event are reasonable, the evidence
for each does not create an obstruction, and thus it is unjustified to convict based on speculations of guilt.
2) Evidentiary Obstruction: A situation in which the incriminating evidence is probabilistically overwhelming, but the exculpatory evidence is not. In such a situation, conviction is
demanded based on speculations of guilt as long as these do
not insult common sense. Conviction based on speculations of
guilt is appropriate whether the logic to make the exculpatory
evidence consistent with the guilt hypothesis is inferable, or
whether even it's the existence of said logic is inferable, even
if the fact finders cannot identify it.
3) Evidentiary Paradox: Both the exculpatory and the incriminating evidence are probabilistically overwhelming. In this case,
conviction based on speculations of guilt is inappropriate.
4) Speculations of Power: A case in which both the incriminating
event and the exculpatory event are uncommon, but logic
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dictates that one of them must have occurred. Based on unconditional a priori probability, both events are rare, so they offset
such other, and neither can be discounted because of its rarity.
In principle, the court may convict based on speculations of
guilt in this case, as long as it takes into consideration other
exculpatory elements.
We believe that this typology is important to determine the
considerations of guilt or innocence in general, and the weight to be
ascribed to speculations of guilt in particular.

